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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff's Gary A. Porter's appeal is from a final judgment
(R. 132) of the Third Judicial District Court/ Salt Lake County/
enforcing a settlement agreement reached between the partiesMr. Porter filed his appeal in the Utah Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court assigned the appeal to this court pursuant to its
statutory pour-over authority/ Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
This court has jurisdiction over cases assigned to it by the
Utah Supreme Court.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REYIEN
AND STANDARDS OP REVIEW FOR EACH ISSUE
A.
The Summary Judgment Motion Issue
Appellees West American Finance Corporation ("WAFCo") and
Olympus Bank filed a motion for summary judgment (R. 23) to
enforce a settlement agreement reached as the result of
negotiations between appellees' attorney and the attorney then
representing appellant Gary A. Porter.

After first issuing a

minute entry (R. 76)/ the trial court granted that motion.

(R.

108).
The first issue to be determined is:

In view of the

affidavit and other admissible evidence before the trial court at
the time it ruled on appellees' summary judgment motion to
enforce a settlement between the parties/ did Mr. Porter present
evidence which demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of
material fact that would preclude an order enforcing the
settlement.

Mr. Porter did not file an affidavit in opposition
1

to appellees' motion.

He did sign a verification/ attesting to

the truth of certain factual assertions set forth in a memorandum
in opposition to the motion.

Therefore/ more specifically the

issue is whether the "verification", not in affidavit form,
turned those factual assertions into "evidence" and/ if so/
whether any of those factual assertions were sufficient to create
a triable issue as to whether a settlement was actually reached
by counsel for the parties.
The title of the motion appellees filed was Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The relief asked for was summary judgment

establishing appellees' accord and satisfaction affirmative
defense.

(R. 23).

The matter was presented to the court as a

summary judgment motion.

The court ruled on it as a summary

judgment motion/ finding that on the undisputed facts appellees
had established that a settlement was agreed upon by counsel and
finding that Mr. Porter did not present evidence sufficient to
create a triable issue otherwise.

(Minute Entry/ R. 76-81).

The standard to be applied by a Utah appellate court when
reviewing an order granting summary judgment is well established.
A trial court should grant summary judgment only if no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas.

Co./ 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993).
The facts and inferences which can be drawn from the
evidence presented to the trial court are viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing a summary judgment motion.
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur./ 854 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1993).
2

Any doubt about whether a non-movant has established a genuine
issue of material fact should be resolved in favor of the nonmovant.

Butterfield v. OkubO/ 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992).

"In reviewing the record on any appeal from summary
judgment/ we treat the statements and evidentiary materials of
the appellant as if a jury would receive them as the only
credible evidence, and we sustain the judgment only if no issues
of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned."
Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 750 P.2d 539/ 540 (Utah
1988) [quoted in Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762
P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah 1988)].
While there are literally dozens of Utah appellate opinions
which state the applicable standard in reviewing an order
granting a summary judgment motion, this action has a twist.

As

stated, the substance of appellees' motion was to request that
the trial find that a settlement had been reached and to enforce
the settlement by requiring Mr. Porter to accept two checks
tendered pursuant to that settlement agreement.

Utah appellate

courts have stated several times that "[t]he decision of a trial
court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement will not be
reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of
discretion."

See Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah

1. It is well settled that in characterizing a document, the
court looks to the substance of the document, and not merely to
its caption. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061,
1064 (Utah 1991); Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555, 558 (Utah
App. 1993).

3

1982); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987); Zions
First Nat, v. B. Jensen Interiors, 781 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989);
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah
App. 1993).
As stated in Zions First Nat, v. B. Jensen Interiors, supra:
"Voluntary settlement of legal disputes is favored by
the law and, under certain circumstances, a settlement
agreement may be summarily enforced as an executory accord.
See Mascaro v. Davis, [supra]. 'The decision of a trial
court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement will not
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an
abuse of discretion.1
Id. at 942 n. 11. Thus, we affirm
the granting of a motion to compel settlement if the record
establishes a binding agreement and 'the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial.' [Citations]."
In Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d
605, 607 (Utah 1979), the opinion states:
"It is now well established that the trial court has
the power to summarily enforce on motion a settlement
agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation
is pending before it. Quite obviously, so simple and speedy
a remedy serves well the policy favoring compromise, which
in turn has made a major contribution to its popularity."
It is also well established that an evidentiary hearing is
not necessary to enforce a settlement agreement.

Tracy-Collins

Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, supra, 592 P.2d 605, 609;
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, supra, 866 P.2d at 586 n.
2.

This rule is consistent with the policy behind the doctrine

of accord and satisfaction "to encourage the economical and
efficient out-of-court settlement of disputes."

Estate Landscape

v. Mountain States, 844 P.2d 322, 328 (Utah 1992); Tesco American
v. Lether, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 61, 62 (Utah App. 1994).
These two principals—that when the evidence establishes a
binding settlement agreement it may be summarily enforced, and
4

that no evidentiary hearing is necessary to summarily enforce a
settlement agreement—when coupled with the policy in Utah
favoring agreements of compromise/ suggest that some less
stringent standard of review than that applied to orders granting
summary judgment may be appropriate when reviewing an order
finding and enforcing a settlement agreement.

Appellees suggest

that if upon review of the evidence before the trial court at the
time it ruled on appellees1 motion/ this court finds the evidence
that a settlement was reached to be compelling (even if not
totally undisputed)/ it could apply the standard of review (if it
does not apply an abuse of discretion standard as suggested by
the cases cited above) suggested by Judge Orme in his dissent in
Brown v. Brown/ 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987).

In that case

Judge Orme wrote:
"The facts concerning whether appellant assented to the
settlement would support a conclusion either way. After
hearing the motion to enforce the settlement . . . the trial
court made findings of fact to the effect that appellant was
bound by the settlement. I concede/ however/ that those
findings are not entitled to the usual deference because the
court did not receive actual testimony. [Citation]. The
court received affidavits and counsels1 representations
about what the testimony would show. . . .
We are in as
good a position to review the affidavits and consider the
proffer as was the trial court
" 744 P.2d at 336.
Appellees suggest that the public policy in favor of
compromise settlements/ and the policy of resolving motions to
enforce settlements economically and efficiently—as evidenced by
the rule that motions to enforce settlements may be determined
summarily and without an evidentiary hearing—would be advanced
by application of such a standard in this case.

This court can

review the evidence which was before the trial court at the time
5

it ruled on appellees' summary judgment motion and/ if that
evidence more readily supports a conclusion that counsel for each
side agreed upon a settlement/ it can affirm the trial court's
ruling.
B.
The "Motion for Reconsideration" Issue
If the court determines that the trial court did not error
when it granted appellees' summary judgment motion/ then an issue
exists as to whether the trial court erred when it denied Mr.
Porter's motion for reconsideration which was based on what
Porter purported was "newly discovered evidence."
Whether based on Rule 59(a) or Rule 60(b)/ Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure/ the granting or denying of a motion seeking
relief from a judgment based on a claim of "newly discovered
evidence" "is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be upset on appeal unless there is an abuse of
discretion."

Hall v. Fitzgerald/ 671 P.2d 224, 228-229 (Utah

1983); Birch v. Birch/ 771 P.2d 1114/ 1117 (Utah App. 1989).
The appellate court will presume the trial court properly
exercised its discretion unless the record clearly shows the
contrary.

Donahue v. Intermountain Health Care/ Inc./ 748 P.2d

1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d
432, 433 (Utah App. 1991).

2. Appellees still contend that in response to their motion to
the trial court, Mr. Porter did not present evidence sufficient
to create a triable issue of fact. That contention is discussed
in the Argument section of this Appellees' Brief, infra.

6

DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions/ statutes/
ordinances/ rules or regulations whose interpretation will be
determinative of the issues raised by Mr. Porter's appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature of the Case
Gary Porter brought this action to foreclose on a mechanic's
lien for excavation work performed by him at the site of
construction of a condominium complex being built by appellee
West American Finance Corporation.

(Amended Complaint/ R. 8 ) .

Porter's cause of action against appellee Olympus Bank was to
determine priority as between his mechanic's lien and a deed of
trust from West American Finance/ as trustor/ to Olympus Bank/ as
trustee and beneficiary.
B.
Course of Proceedings
Gary Porter filed his complaint on April 22/ 1993 (R.
and filed an Amended Complaint on June 17/ 1993.

2),

(R. 8 ) .

After service of summons/ but before they file their answer/
appellees entered into settlement negotiations of Porter's
claims.

It is appellees' contention that the parties/

negotiating through their attorneys/ agreed upon a settlement.
It is undisputed that two checks totalling $15/807.42 were
tendered to Dale Dorius/ the attorney who was then representing
Porter/ in full settlement of Porter's claims.
7

The first check/

for $15/591.42, was tendered on October 19/ 1993.

The second

check, for $216.00/ was tendered on November 12, 1993.
On December 8/ 1993, Mr. Dorius wrote to appellees' attorney
and, in appellees' opinion, reneged on the settlement previously
agreed upon.

(R. 44)

On December 16, 1993, appellees' filed an answer to Porter's
Amended Complaint.

(R. 17).

The answer alleged, as appellees'

fourth affirmative defense, that appellees offered to pay and
Porter agreed to accept, $15,807.42 in full and complete settlement of his claims, and that West American Finance tendered two
checks to Porter's attorney totalling $15,807.42, which tender
was accepted, resulting in an accord and satisfaction of Porter's
claims.

(R. 19).

On January 20, 1994, appellees' moved for summary judgment
on the ground that as a matter of law the parties reached an
accord and satisfaction of Porter's claims, as alleged in the
Fourth Affirmative Defense.

(R. 23). The motion was accompanied

by a memorandum of points and authorities (R. 25), and by the
affidavit of appellees' attorney, Steven H. Lybbert.

(R. 32).

The affidavit identified and referred to several items of
correspondence between Lybbert and Dale Dorius, copies of which
were attached as exhibits to the affidavit.

(R. 38-44).

On January 28, 1994, Mr. Dorius sought to withdraw as
Porter's attorney.

(R. 51).

On March 29, 1994, Porter (through his present attorney)
filed a pleading entitled "Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(R. 71). No affidavits were filed in
8

opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion/ but the
••Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" contained
a "Verification"/ signed under oath by Porter/ wherein he
affirmed that he had "read the foregoing instrument and that
based upon my personal knowledge the factual allegations
3
contained therein are true and correct." (R. 74).
Appellees' filed their Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 67). Thereafter/

by a six-page minute entry dated April 1/ 1994 (R. 76-81/ and
Addendum hereto)/ the court granted the summary judgment motion.
On April 15/ 1994 (before a formal order granting the motion
was entered)/ Porter filed a motion asking the court to
reconsider its ruling.

(R. 82).

Appellees filed their Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration on April 28/ 1994 (R. 97)/
and filed a notice to submit the motion for reconsideration for
decision on May 5/ 1994.

(R. 104).

On May 20/ 1994, Porter filed a Reply to Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider.

(R. 111).

Accompanying the reply memorandum was Dale Dorius' affidavit in
which Dorius asserted/ for the first time/ that there had not
been a "finalized agreement" of settlement.

(R. 119).

3. Porter first filed his "Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment" on March 11, 1994 (R. 60)/ but the
"Verification" was unsigned. He then filed the same pleading/
now signed by Mr. Porter/ on March 29/ 1994.

9

Appellees filed an objection to the reply memorandum based/
primarily/ on the untimeliness of Dale Dorius' affidavit.
121).

(R.

Porter filed a reply to the objection on June 15/ 1994.

(R. 127).
By Minute Entry dated June 22/ 1994/ the court denied the
motion for reconsideration.

(R. 130).

On July 18/ 1994 the court entered a formal order denying
the motion for reconsideration (R. 134)/ and entered summary
judgment for appellees.

(R. 131).

Porter filed a notice of appeal on August 15/ 1994.

(R.

138).
C.
Statement of Facts
1.
Those Facts Which Were Before the Trial Court
When it Ruled on Appellees1 Summary Judgment Motion
The affidavit of Steven Lybbert (R. 32-37) and the exhibits
thereto (R.38-44) submitted to the trial court with appellees'
summary judgment motion established the following facts which
appellees contend were/ at the time the court ruled on the
summary judgment/ undisputed:
1.

Following service of summonses upon appellees/ Stephen

M. Harmsen/ president of appellee West American Finance/ Steven
H. Lybbert/ appellees1 attorney, Mr. Porter/ and his attorney.
Dale Dorius/ met at Lybbert's office to discuss settlement.
meeting took place on August 24, 1993.
R. 32-33).

10

The

(Lybbert affidavit, 5T3/

2.

At that meeting the parties reviewed invoices from

Porter to West American's construction manager and discussed West
American's claim that as a result of negligent overexcavation at
the construction site/ it was necessary for West American to
expend about $11/500 for extra shoring and extra engineering that
would not have been necessary but for the alleged negligent overexcavation.

Mr. Harmsen expressed his willingness to settle

Porter's mechanic's lien claim if a compromise could be reached
as to an appropriate set off for that extra shoring and
engineering.
3.

(Lybbert Affidavit/ H3/ R. 33).

Following that meeting/ Dorius and Lybbert discussed

settlement several times by telephone.

On behalf of appellees/

Lybbert proposed that appellees pay the full amount of Porter's
claim/ less a $3/135 set off for the extra shoring and engineering work/ less amounts billed by Porter to West American for
amounts billed by Pioneer Trucking to Porter which had been paid
directly by West American to Pioneer Trucking.
affidavit/ 1F 4,
4.

(Lybbert

R. 33) .

That settlement offer was confirmed in a letter from

Lybbert to Dorius which stated/ in part:
"West American Finance Company is willing to pay $3/135
less than the full amount of Mr. Porter's billings in full
settlement of his action. I assume that means that West
American would pay $22/465 less any amount it paid directly
to Pioneer Trucking for amounts billed by Mr. Porter."
(Exhibit "A" to Lybbert affidavit, R. 38).
5.

By letter from Dorius to Lybbert dated August 31/ 1993/

Dorius accepted the $3/135.00 setoff amount on the condition that
West American pay interest from the date of filing the mechanic's
11

lien and attorney fees.

(Exhibit "Bff to the Lybbert affidavit/

R. 39).
6.

After August 31/ Dorius and Lybbert negotiated by tele-

phone the remaining items of damages—a rate of interest on the
principal amount to be paid by defendants/ and attorney fees.
(Lybbert affidavit/ 1T 6, R. 34).
7.

By September 27, 1993/ Dorius and Lybbert had agreed

that West American would pay 8% interest from the date the
mechanic's lien was filed until the claim was paid.

(Lybbert

affidavit, 1T 7, R. 34) .
8.

A few days prior to October 19/ 1993/ Dorius advised

Lybbert by telephone that Porter would accept the principal
amount previously agreed upon (the amount of Porter's billings to
West American less a $3/135 setoff/ less amounts paid by West
American directly to Pioneer Trucking)/ plus 8% interest/ and
that each side would assume his or its own attorney fees.
(Lybbert affidavit/ IT 8, R. 34).
9.

On October 19, 1993/ Lybbert enclosed West American's

check for $15/591.42 in a letter to Mr. Dorius.

Enclosed with

the letter and the check (and a notice of dismissal and a release
of lien) was a sheet of paper entitled Gary Porter Settlement/
prepared by Stephen Harmsen of West American/ which contained the
calculations as to how the amount of $15/591.42 was reached.
(Exhibit "C" to the Lybbert affidavit/ R. 40).
10. Sometime between October 19 and October 28/ 1993/ Dorius
and Lybbert spoke by telephone.

Dorius told Lybbert that Porter

wanted verification of the amount paid by West American directly
12

to Pioneer Trucking.

Dorius also stated that Porter had concerns

about a few of the other amounts set forth on the sheet entitled
"Gary Porter Settlement".

A couple of invoice amounts as set

forth on the "Gary Porter Settlement" calculation varied from the
amounts on the actual invoi-ces.

(Lybbert affidavit/ 1 10/ R. 34-

35).
11. On October 28/ 1993/ Lybbert faxed a letter to Dorius
with copies of the front and back of a check from West American
payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel.

In the letter/ Lybbert

acknowledged his lack of understanding about the invoice amount
variances set forth on the "Gary Porter Settlement" calculation
and acknowledged that some further amount of money might be
payable to "finally resolve this matter."

Lybbert stated his

intent to discuss those amounts with Stephen Harmsen when Harmsen
returned from "out of town".

(Exhibit "D" to the Lybbert

affidavit/ R. 41).
12. On November 5/ 1993 Lybbert faxed another letter to
Dorius addressing the invoice amount variances/ and expressing
his view that another $216.00 ($200 principal and $16 interest)
as payable "in order to finally settle this matter."
also states:

"Please consult with Mr. Porter.

The letter

If that is

acceptable/ please contact me and I will promptly forward a check
in that amount."

(Exhibit "E" to the Lybbert affidavit/ R. 42).

13. Sometime between November 5 and November 11/ 1993/
Lybbert and Dorius again discussed the matter by telephone.
Dorius instructed Lybbert to obtain a second check from West
13

American so that the matter could be finally settled.

(Lybbert

affidavit/ U13/ R. 35).
14. On November 12/ 1993 Lybbert sent a second check for
$216.00 to Dorius along with a letter which stated/ in part:
"Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which/ when
added to the $15/591.42 previously tendered/ is full settlement
of the above-referenced action."

The letter also stated:

"On October 19/ 1993 I sent you an original Notice of
Dismissal and an original Release of Lien. Please sign the
Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I can file
it with the court. Please obtain Mr. Porter's signature on
the Release of Lien/ then return it to me . . .."(Lybbert
affidavit, 11 13 [R. 351-36], and Exhibit "F" thereto [R.
43]).
15. When he still had not received the notice of dismissal
or a signed release of lien by early December Lybbert contacted
Dorius by telephone.
been reached.

Dorius did not deny that a settlement had

He merely stated that he would contact Mr. Porter.

(Lybbert affidavit/ 1F 14, R. 36).
16. Within a few days thereafter/ Lybbert received a letter
from Dorius dated December 8/ 1993 stating/ in effect/ that
Porter believed that the $3/135 offset was intended for amounts
paid directly by West American to Pioneer Trucking.

(Exhibit "G"

to the Lybbert affidavit/ R. 44).
17. At no time did Dorius ever state to Lybbert that he
believed the $3/135 offset was being taken by West American for
any reason other than as a compromise of West American1s claim
that it expended a much greater amount to remedy the alleged
overexcavation by Mr. Porter.

To the contrary/ on more than one

ocassion Mr. Dorius had verbally affirmed that he understood that
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the $3/135 offset was in compromise of West American's claim to
an offset for the alleged negligent overexcavation.

(Lybbert

affidavit/ U 15/ R. 36).
18. As of the date appellees filed their summary judgment
motion/ the two checks tendered by West American to Dorius in
settlement of the action (totalling $15/807.42) had not been
returned.

(Lybbert affidavit/ IT 17/ R. 37).

Porter did not file his own or any other affidavits in
opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion.

He did submit

a memorandum which contained a "Statement of Disputed Facts" in
opposition to the motion.

(R. 71). The memorandum contained a

"verification" (R. 75) whereby Porter affirmed that he had read
the memorandum "and that upon my personal knowledge the factual
allegations contained therein are true and correct."
The only "factual allegation" set forth in the Statement of
Disputed Facts portion of the memorandum was as follows:
1. Plaintiff admits that the parties discussed settlement/ but denies that any agreement was reached."
The remainder of the Statement of Disputed Facts consisted
of Porter's explanation of inferences that might be reached from
the exhibits attached to Steven Lybbert's affidavit/ ^f those
exhibits had been before the court without the context of the
4
affidavit testimony.

4. The Statement of Undisputed Facts also set forth/
correctly/ that after the summary judgment motion was filed/
enclosed with a letter dated January 28/ 1994, the two checks
tendered to settle the case were returned to appellees' attorney.
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2.
Those Additional Facts Presented to the Trial Court
In Connection With Gary Porter's Motion for
Reconsideration
After the trial court issued its minute entry granting
appellees' summary judgment motion/ Gary Porter filed a motion
for reconsideration.

(R. 82).

The motion for reconsideration

contained a Statement of Facts.

(R 83-85).

The motion for

reconsideration also contained a "Verification" of those facts
signed by Porter's present attorney/ Brian W. Steffensen.

(R.

89).
Those facts tend to show that prior to the withdrawal of
Dale Dorius as Porter's attorney/ Porter contacted Steffensen and
asked him to review the file.

Porter "indicated" that he was

frustrated by Dorius' attempts to convince him to accept
appellees' settlement offer.

(R. 83).

Steffensen telephoned Dorius.

Dorius assured Steffensen

that he had never finalized any settlement agreement with
appellees.

(R. 83).

After the court entered in minute entry granting appellees'
summary judgment motion/ Steffensen forwarded a propsoed
affidavit to Dorius for Dorius' signature/ but Dorius wrote back
to Steffensen declining to sign the affidavit.

(R. 85). The

letter from Dorius to Steffensen states/ in part:
"Per your request/ enclosed please find my letter to
Gary Porter dated December 2, 1993 which summarizes the
settlement negotiations. Also/ enclosed please find my
letter of December 14/ 1993 in which I specifically
indicated to Mr. Porter that he had reneged on the
settlement." (R. 93).
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The December 14/ 1993 letter from Dorius to Porter/ referred
to in Dorius1 April 14/ 1994 letter to Steffensen/ states/ in
part:

w

[I]t does appear you reneged on your $3/100.00 discount."

(R. 95).
Only at the time Porter filed a memorandum (R. Ill) replying
to appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (R. 97)/ did Porter file an affidavit signed by
Dale Dorius.

That affidavit (R. 119) stated that:

3. That there was an agreed to settlement of the
principal amount owed to Plaintiff plus eight percent
interest minus $3/135.00/ and Defendant would drop the
$11/000.00 counterclaim set off.
4. There was not a finalized agreement as to the
amount the Defendant could offset for the Pioneer Truck
charges.
5. The outstanding issue is whether or not Defendant
paid Pioneer Trucking/ and if these amounts are proper
offsets. This appears to be the only dispute in regard to
the settlement.
It is appellees' contention, as discussed in the Argument
portion of this Appellees' Brief/ that the trial court had wide
discretion as to whether to consider facts first brought to its
attention after it had granted summary judgment/ in determining
whether to reconsider its ruling granting the summary judgment
motion.

17

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented in support of appellees1 Motion for
Summary Judgment was sufficient to establish prima facie that the
parties/ negotiating through their attorneys—Dale Dorius for
Porter and Steven Lybbert for appellees—reached an accord and
satisfaction of Gary Porter's claims.

The evidence showed that

through a series of partial agreements a final settlement was
reached/ that checks were tendered to pay the settlement/ and
that those checks were only rejected after appellees asked the
court/ via a summary judgment motion/ to enforce the settlement.
The only evidence which the trial court might consider in
opposition to the summary judgment motion was Gary Porter's
verification of a factual assertion that "Plaintiff admits that
the parties discussed settlement/ but denies that any settlement
was reached."
Even if Porter's "verification" of that conclusory statement
is an acceptable substitute for an affidavit/ as required by Rule
56(e)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ that statement did not
create a triable issue of material fact because (1) there was no
factual showing that Porter could competently testify as to what
his attorney/ Dale Dorius/ agreed or did not agree/ and (2) there
was no assertion that Dorius did not have the authority to settle
his client's claims or to accept the checks tendered in full
settlement of the action.

Porter never did raise any argument

that he could not be bound by his attorney's acts under the
doctrine of apparant authority.
18

Once the trial court granted summary judgment/ whether to
consider additional evidence presented in connection with
Porter's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling
was a matter for the trial court's exercise of its discretion.
In this case/ it was appropriate for the court not to
consider further evidence because/ first/ none of the new
evidence presented with the motion for reconsideration was "newly
discovered evidence" as that term is used in Rules 59(a) and
60(b)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ and/ second/

Dale Dorius1

affidavit was only filed at the time Porter replied to appellees'
memorandum in opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
Despite Porter's present attorney's lament that Dorius would
not provide him with a timely affidavit/ Porter never asked the
trial court/ pursuant to Rule 56(f)/ U.R.C.P./ for time to
convince Dorius to submit an affidavit or/ if necessary/ to take
Dorius' deposition.
Since Dorius' affidavit was only filed in connection with
the motion for reconsideration (and at the time Porter filed a
reply memorandum, at that)/ it was further a proper exercise of
the trial court's discretion to not consider statements in that
affidavit because those statements which might/ if timely
presented/ have created a triable issue of material fact/ were
contrary to assertions by Dorius in letters to Porter that Porter
had "reneged" on an agreed-upon settlement.
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ARGUMENT
A.
In Determining Whether the Trial Court Properly Granted
Summary Judgment/ This Court Must Distinguish Between
Facts Before the Trial Court When It Ruled on the
Summary Judgment Motion and Facts That Were
Only Made A Part of the Record When
Porter Moved for Reconsideration
Sometimes a stew made with the leftovers of two or more
different meals tastes better than any of the original meals. So
it is with appellant's brief.

He invites this court to taste his

"stew"/ consisting of all the evidence presented to the trial
court in three separate servings.
First/ Gary Porter "verified" a Statement of Disputed Facts
(R. 60) submitted in opposition to appellees' motion for summary
judgment.

Then; some new (but not newly discovered) evidence was

placed before the trial court when Porter moved for reconsideration of the ruling granting the summary judgment motion.
82).

(R.

Finally/ further evidence—an affidavit (R. 119) signed by

Dale Dorius—was filed by Porter along with a reply memorandum
(R. Ill) to appellees' memorandum in opposition to the motion for
5
reconsideration.
In the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant Gary A.
Porter's Brief/ Porter has combined what little "evidence" was
presented to the trial court in opposition to appellees' summary
judgment motion with the evidence presented to the trial court at
the time he moved for reconsideration of the ruling granting the

5. As discussed below/ the affidavit did not consist of "newly
discovered" evidence either.
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summary judgment motion/ and with the evidence set forth in the
affidavit of Dale Dorius filed only at the time of filing of a
reply memorandum.

By doing so/ without distinguishing what

evidence was before the trial court whenit ruled on the summary
judgment motion/ Porter has come up with a "palatable" argument a
triable issue of material fact exists as to whether a settlement
was reached as the result of the exchange of letter and telephone
conversations between appellees' attorney and Porter's original
attorney.
However/ when it ruled on appellees' summary judgment
motion/ the trial court didn't have the luxury of knowing what
further evidence might have been available to Porter to raise a
triable issue of material fact had he been diligent in obtaining
it.

Instead/ the trial court did as trial courts must do and

ruled on the evidence available to it rather than speculate as to
what other evidence might be "out there".
As discussed in part B. of this Argument/ the "evidence"
presented in opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion
failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of
material fact as to appellees' assertion that a settlement had
been agreed upon.
B.
The Evidence Presented in Support of
Appellees' Summary Judgment Motion Demonstrated
The Existence of a Valid/ Enforceable Settlement Agreement
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of
disputes.

Such agreements under the proper circumstances may be

summarily enforced.

...

An agreement of compromise and
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settlement constitutes an executory accord.

Since an executory

accord 'constitutes a valid enforceable contract' basic contract
principles affect the determination of when a settlement agreement should be so enforced."

Mascaro v. Davis/ 741 P.2d 938/ 942

(Utah 1987) (quoting Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist/ 642 P.2d
382/ 384 (Utah 1982).
As with all contracts/ an accord requires a meeting of the
minds.

Petersen v. Petersen/ 709 P.2d 372/ 375 (Utah 1985).

The

accord need not be in writing as long as the intent of the
parties and the extent and scope of their agreement is clear.
Id.
In this case/ the letters between appellees' attorney and
Dale Dorius/ Porter's attorney during settlement negotiations (R.
38-43)/ when coupled with appellees' attorney's affidavit
testimony (R. 32-37) detailing the telephone conversations
between him and Dorius and providing a foundation for the
letters/ establish the following sequence of agreements that
resulted in a binding agreement:
First/ Porter's attorney/ Mr. Dorius/ agreed to accept a
$3/135 offset against Porter's claims in compromise of West
American's claim that it was entitled to an $11/500 offset as the
result of costs incurred because of negligent overexcavation by
Porter at the construction site.

(R. 33-34; R. 39). Then the

attorneys reached an agreement that West American would pay 8%
interest.

(R. 34). West American requested/ and Dorius agreed

(after receiving verification of payment by West American to
Pioneer Trucking) to a further offset against the amount of
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Porter's invoices for amounts paid by West American to Pioneer
Trucking which were also included on Porter's, invoices to West
American (i.e., amounts which Pioneer billed Porter, which Porter
passed on to West American, and which West American paid directly
to Pioneer).

(R. 34-35).

The evidence demonstrates that after

appellees' attorney sent one check for $15,591.42 to Dorius,
appellees' attorney offered to send a second check for $216 to
Dorius "in order to finally settle this matter."

(R. 35; R. 42).

The evidence demonstrates that during a telephone conversation
sometime between November 5 and November 11, 1993, Dorius told
Appellees' attorney to "obtain a second check from West American
so that the matter could be finally settled" (Emphasis added) (R.
35).

Finally, the evidence demonstrates that the second check

was sent to Dorius along with a letter which stated, in part:
"Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which, when
added to the $15,591.42 previously tendered, is full settlement
of the above-referenced action."

(R. 43).

In short, the evidence demonstrates an offer of settlement (delivery of one check and an offer to send a second check
"in order to finally settle this matter"), an acceptance of that
offer (telephonic instruction from Dorius to appellees' attorney
"to obtain a second check . . . so that the matter could finally

6. Without that offset Porter would, of course, been unjustly
enriched. He would have received the benefit of sub-contract
work by Pioneer without paying for it. Conversely, without the
offset West American would pay twice for the same work.
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be settled")/ and delivery of that additional check (constituting
the "satisfaction" portion of the accord and satisfaction).
It is of no legal consequence that the parties did not sign
a settlement agreement.
supra# 866 P.2d 581.

Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems/

"It is a basic and long-established

principle of contract law that agreements are enforceable even
though there is neither a written memorialization of that agreement nor the signatures of the parties/ unless specifically
required by the statute of frauds."
1000, 1001 (Utah 1987).

Murray v. State/ 737 P.2d

"Parties have no right to welch on a

settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between
when the deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be
garnered on a stipulation."

Brown v. Brown, supra/ 744 P.2d at

336 (Orme/ J. dissenting).

Neither does a party have a right to

welch on a settlement agreement during the period between "when
the deal is struck" and a plaintiff's attorney signs and files a
notice or stipulation of dismissal.
In the Argument portion of his brief/ Porter attacks the
sufficiency of the "Undisputed Facts" set forth in the memorandum
appellees submitted in support of their summary judgment motion.
Porter states that "[n]owhere in these six paragraphs does West
American state that a final agreement was reached which is
binding upon Porter."

That there was a binding final agreement

reached is/ of course/ the conclusion appellees wanted the trial
court to reach from the predicate facts established in the
affidavit of their attorney and the exhibits to that affidavit.
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c.
Gary Porter Failed to Present Any Evidence Which
Refuted the Evidence Presented in Support
of the Motion for Summary Judgment
In opposition to appellees1 summary judgment motion/ Porter
set forth a "Statement of Disputed Facts" (R. 71)/ which he
"verified".

(R. 74).

Even assuming the "verification" was a

sufficient substitute for an affidavit/ the verified "facts" did
not demonstrate the existence of a triable dispute over whether
Dale Dorius agreed to settle the case.
Paragraphs 2.(a), 2.(b), 2.(c) and 2.(d) of the "Statement
of Disputed Facts" do no more than suggest what the letters
attached as exhibits to appellees' attorney's affidavit might
infer/ ij[ those exhibits were before the court without the
foundation of the affidavit testimony.
set forth no foundation.

Porter's "verification"

Paragraph 2.(d) states that "the

plaintiff nver acknowledged in writing or otherwise that these
counter-proposals were acceptable."

(Emphasis added).

himself did not/ but his attorney/ Dale Dorius/ did.
attorney's affidavit states clearly:

Porter
Appellees'

"Sometime between November

5 and November 11, 1993 . . . [Dorius] instructed me to obtain a
second check from West American so that the matter could be
finally settled."

(R. 35).

That leaves paragraph 1. of the Statement of Disputed Facts.
(R. 71).

Porter verified the statement:

"Plaintiff admits that

the parties discussed settlement/ but denies that any agreement
was reached."

The question, then/ is does that conclusory
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statement give rise to a triable issue of material fact.

The

answer is negative.
The assertion that "[p]laintiff . . . denies that any
agreement was reached" is nothing more than a conclusion of law.
A settlement agreement is a contract.

Petersen v. Petersen/

supra/ 709 P.2d 375; Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems/
supra/ 866 P.2d 581.

The essential elements of a contract are

parties competent to contract, a proper subject matter, legal
consideration/ mutuality of agreement (a "meeting of the minds")
and mutuality of obligation,

Mallory v. City of Detroit/ 419

N.W.2d 115/ 118 (Mich.App. 1989).

Appellees1 attorney's

affidavit and the exhibits to the affidavit set forth predicate
facts sufficient to establish each of those elements.

Porter's

conclusory assertion denying that "any agreement was reached"
does not dispute any predicate fact set forth in the affidavit as
supplemented by the exhibits.
When evidence as to the elements of a contract is
conflicting or admits of more than one inference/ it is an issue
of fact whether a contract exists.
1289, 1291 (Utah 1981).

O'Hara v. Hall/ 628 P.2d

Conversely, when there is no conflict as

to the evidence relating to the elements of a contract, the
question whether the undisputed facts establish the existence of
a contract is one of law.

As stated in Cortland Asbestos Prod.,

Inc. v. J. & K. Plumb. & H. Co., 304 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1969):
" . . . while the existence of a contract is a question
of fact, the question of whether a certain or undisputed
state of facts establishes a contract is one of law for the
courts and, thus, since the facts herein are undisputed, the
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question whether there was a contract is for the court."
304 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
Not only is the assertion "[p]laintiff . . . denies that any
agreement was reached" a mere conclusion but/ as the trial court
pointed out in its minute entry granting the motion (R. 76-81
[included in the Addendum hereto]):
"The plaintiff's response does not include any sworn
testimony of the plaintiff's prior counsel [Mr. Dorius] or
the plaintiff/ either suggesting that Mr. Dorius did not
have the authority to accept the settlement offer on behalf
of the plaintiff/ or that Mr. Dorius did not as the
Affidavit of Mr. Lybbert alleges/ accept the settlement
proposal between the dates of November 5 and November 11/
1993."
The court correctly took note of the absence of any evidence
that Mr. Dorius did not have authority to accept the settlement
offer he did.

Porter's conclusory assertion that no agreement

was reached/ is totally insufficient to establish a foundation
for Porter to testify (or verify) as to what his attorney did or
did not do or say.

Porter presented no argument—at either the

trial court or in his brief before this court—that he is not
"bound by his [attorney's] acts under the doctrine of apparant
7
authority."
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems/ supra/ 866
P.2d at 584.
Clearly/ in light of the "evidence" offered in opposition to
appellees' summary judgment motion—a statement which was in fact

7. An attorney is his client's agent. Unlike other situations
where agents deal with each other/ the Rules of Professional
Conduct preclude an attorney from contacting his client's
adversary in order to ask: "Does your attorney have authority to
settle this case?"
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nothing more than a conclusion of law—the trial court correctly
granted the motion.
D.
It Was Within the Proper Exercise of the
Trial Court's Discretion to Deny Gary Porter's
Motion for Reconsideration
Whether Gary Porter's motion for reconsideration of the
trial court's ruling granting appellees' summary judgment motion
was pursuant to Rule 59(a), Rule 60(b) or Rule 52(b), it was
based on what he terms "new evidence."

However, it is clear that

the "new evidence" was not "newly discovered" evidence.
"Evidence must meet several requirements to qualify as newly
discovered evidence . . . .

In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah 1984), we stated that the moving
party must show that the evidence has three characteristics in
order for a new trial to be granted.

First, it must be material,

competent evidence which is in fact newly discovered.

Second, it

must be such that it could not, by due diligence, have been
discovered and produced at trial."

In Interest of S.R., 735 P.2d

53, 57-58 (Utah 1987).
Only after the trial court ruled on and granted appellees'
summary judgment motion did Porter decide the time was right to
disclose communications between himself and his present attorney,
between his present attorney and Dale Dorius, and between himself
and Dorius which occurred prior to the time Porter filed his
opposition to the summary judgment motion.
The affidavit of Dale Dorius [R. 119], upon which Porter
relies almost exclusively in his brief as "proof" that the trial
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court abused its discretion in not setting aside the summary
judgment/ was filed only at the time Porter filed a reply
memorandum (R. Ill) to appellees' memorandum (R. 97) in
opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
It was within the proper exercise of the trial court's
discretion not to grant the motion for reconsideration despite
Dorius1 affidavit for several reasons. First/ as discussed above/
the affidavit was not timely. When he filed his motion for
reconsideration/ Porter complained about the refusal of Dorius
(up to that point) to provide an affidavit.

He even attached an

affidavit which Dorius had declined to sign as an exhibit to his
motion for reconsideration.

However/ Porter never did file an

affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/
requesting additional time to obtain Dorius' affidavit or to take
his deposition.
Second/ the assertions of fact in the affidavit were not
"newly discovered" evidence.

The evidence before the court

demonstrated that only after the court ruled on the summary
judgment motion did Porter's attorney request an affidavit from
Dorius.

(R. 93 [a letter from Dorius to Porter's present

attorney dated April 14/ 1994 stating/ in part:

"I am advised

the court has already granted summary judgment/ and prior to same
you never requested an affidavit or any input from my office."]).
The statement in Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials/ Inc./ 576 P.2d
174/ 176 (Utah 1977)/ that "the evidentiary matters termed as new
were reasonable and proper subjects of discovery and could have
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been obtained by the exercise of ordinary diligence" applies
equally to this action.
Third/ at the time Dorius1 affidavit was filed/ there was
before the court/ filed as exhibits to the motion for reconsideration/ convincing evidence that Dorius did indeed believe a
settlement had been reached.

In the same letter quoted in the

preceding paragraph (R. 93)/ Dorius wrote:

"Enclosed please find

my letter of December 14/ 1993 in which I specifically indicated
to Mr. Porter that he had reneged on the settlement."

The

December 14/ 1993 letter from Dorius to Porter (R. 95) states/ in
part:

"From the correspondence regarding settlement of this case

it does appear you reneged on your $3/100.00 discount."
It even appears that at this time/ in his brief/ Porter is
attempting to introduce new (but not "newly discovered")
evidence.

Exhibits D [a letter from Dorius to Porter]/ E [a

letter from Porter to Dorius] and H [another letter from Dorius
to Porter] to the addendum to Porter's brief appear not to be
part of the record in this action.

Appellees submit that

Porter's use in the addendum to his brief of correspondence not a
part of the record/ while ignoring letters from Dorius in which
Dorius expressed his opinion that Porter had reneged on a settlement/ is telling of Porter's lack of diligence in presenting to
the trial court all evidence which might tend to create a triable
issue of material fact.
Given the lack of diligence in obtaining a timely affidavit
from Dorius/ or in taking his deposition/ and given that Dorius'
affidavit seems to contradict statements made in letters from
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Dorius to Porter and to his present attorney/ it was certainly an
appropriate exercise of the trial court's discretion to deny
Porter's motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above/ and on the record in this action/
appellees respectfully submit that the summary judgment entered
herein was properly granted/ and Gary Porter's motion for reconsideration of the ruling granting that motion was properly
denied.

The summary judgment/ and the order denying Porter's

motion for reconsideration/ should both be affirmed.
Appellees should be awarded their costs.

Rule 34/ Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Dated this / /

day of February/ 1995.

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Appellees West
American Finance Corporation
and Olympus Bank
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ADDENDUM
Affidavit of Steven H, Lybbert in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment (and exhibits thereto) (but
excluding certificate of service) [R. 32-44]
Minute Entry (ruling on motion for summary judgment)
[R. 76-81]
Minute Entry (denying motion for reconsideration)
Summary Judgment (Judgment of Dismissal)
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[R. 130]

[R. 132-133]

STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar N o . 4 1 8 7
Attorney for
Defendants
>r Defendants
^
Suite 302 Fe:
'elt Building
/)<T>J
MAJUJ"
341 South Ma:
lain Street
l/^^fJi^P^
Salt Lake City,
84111
^>4 '
'
Telephone: :ity,
(801)Utah
363-0890
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH
GARY A. PORTER dba PORTER &
SON'S CONSTRUCTION,

)
)

PJaintiff,

]1
1
1

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN H.
LYBBERT IN SUPPORT OF
D E F E N D A N T S 1 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and
OLYMPUS BANK,

)

Case N o . 930902266 CV

Defendants.

)

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

vs.

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Steven H. Lybbert, being first duly sworn upon oath, s t a t e s :
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah.

I am

the attorney of record for defendants in the above-entitled
action.
2.

This action involves plaintiff's claim to foreclose on a

mechanic's lien for excavation work performed by plaintiff at the
site of construction of a condominium complex being developed by
defendant West American Finace C o r p o r a t i o n .
3.

Following service of summonses upon defendants in this

action, Stephen M. Harmsen, president of defendant West American
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Finance/ and I met with Gary A. Porter and his attorney/ Dale M.
Dorius/ at my office to discuss settlement of the action.

The

meeting took place on August 24, 1993.
3.

At that meeting the parties reviewed invoices from

plaintiff to West American's construction manager and discussed
West American's claim that as a result of negligent overexcavation at the construction site/ it was necessary for West American
to expend about $11,500 for extra shoring and extra engineering
that would not have been necessary but for the alleged negligent
overexcavation.

Stephen Harmsen expressed his willingness to

settle Mr. Porter's mechanic's lien claim if a compromise could
be reached as to an appropriate set off for that extra shoring
and engineering.
4.

Following that meeting, Mr. Dorius and I discussed

settlement several times by telephone.

On behalf of defendants,

I proposed that defendants pay the full amount of Mr. Porter's
claim, less a $3,135 set off for the extra work described above,
less amounts billed by Porter to West American for amounts billed
by Pioneer Trucking to Porter (and in turn billed by Porter to
West American) which had been paid directly by West American to
Pioneer Trucking.

I confirmed that settlement offer in a letter

to Mr. Dorius dated August 31, 1993.

A copy of my August 31/

1993 letter to Mr. Dorius is attached hereto and marked as
Exhibit "A".
5.

By letter to me also dated August 31, 1993, Mr. Dorius

accepted the $3,135.00 offset amount.

A copy of Mr. Dorius'

2

00033

August 31, 1993 letter to me is attached hereto and Marked as
Exhibit "B".
6.

After August 31, 1993 Mr- Dorius and I negotiated by

telephone concerning the remaining items of damage—a rate of
interest on the principal amount to be paid by defendants and Mr.
Dorius1 attorney fees7.

By September 27, 1993 Mr. Dorius and I had agreed that

defendants would pay 8% interest from the date the mechanic's
lien was filed until the claim was paid.
8.

A few days prior to October 19, 1993 Mr. Dorius advised

me by telephone that Mr. Porter would accept the principal amount
previously agreed upon (the principal amount of Porter's billings
to West American less a $3/500 set off/ less amounts paid by West
American directly to Pioneer trucking)/ plus 8% interest/ and
that each side would assume his or its own attorney fees.
9.

On October 19/ 1993 I mailed West American's check for

$15,591.42 to Mr. Dorius.

A copy of the letter from me to Mr.

Dorius with which that check was enclosed is attached hereto and
marked as Exhibit "C".

Also enclosed with that letter was a

sheet of paper entitled Gary Porter Settlement/ prepared by Mr.
Harmsen of West American, which contained the calculations as to
how the amount of $15,591.42 was reached.
10. Sometime between October 19 and October 28, 1993 I had a
further telephone discussion with Mr. Dorius.

He stated that his

client wanted verification of an amount paid by West American
directly to Pioneer Trucking.

He also stated that his client had
3
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concerns about a few of the other amounts set forth on the sheet
entitled Gary Porter Settlement.

A couple of invoice amounts as

set forth on the Gary Porter Settlement calculation varied from
the actual amounts on the invoices.
11. On October 28, 1993 I faxed a letter to Mr. Dorius with
copies of the front and back of a check from West American
payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel.

I also acknowledged my lack of

understanding about the invoice amount variances set forth on the
Gary Porter Settlement calculation and acknowledged that some
further amount of money might be payable by my clients to
"finally resolve this matter."

I stated my intent to discuss

those amounts with Mr. Harmsen when he returned from "out of
town."

A copy of my October 28/ 1993 letter to Mr. Dorius is

attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "D."
12. On November 5, 1993 I faxed another letter to Mr. Dorius
in which I addressed his concerns about those invoice amount
variances, and stated my view that another $216.00 ($200
principal and $16 interest) was payable "in order to finally
settle this matter."

A copy of my November 5, 1993 letter to Mr.

Dorius is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "E."
13. Sometime between November 5 and November 11/ 1993 I
again discussed the matter with Mr. Dorius by telephone.

He

instructed me to obtain a second check from West American so that
the matter could be finally settled.

On November 12/ 1993 I sent

a second check for $216.00 to Mr. Dorius along with a letter
which stated, in part:

"Enclosed please find my client's check

for $216.00 which, when added to the $15,591.42 previously
4
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tendered/ is full settlement of the above-referenced action."

A

copy of my November 12/ 1993 letter to Mr. Dorius is attached
hereto and marked as Exhibit "F".
14. When I still had not received a Stipulation of Dismissal
and a signed Release of Lien by early December I contacted Mr.
Dorius by telephone.
had been reached.
Porter.

Mr. Dorius did not deny that a settlement

He merely stated that he would contact Mr.

Within a few days thereafter/ I received a letter from

Mr. Dorius dated December 8/ 1993 stating, in effect/ that his
client believed that the $3/135 offset was for amounts paid
directly by West American to Pioneer Trucking.

A copy of Mr.

Dorius's December 8/ 1993 letter is attached hereto and marked as
Exhibit

"G."

15. At no time has Mr. Dorius ever stated that he believed
the $3,135 offset was being taken by West American (and granted
by Mr. Porter) for any reason other than as a compromise of West
American's claim that it expended a much greater amount to remedy
the a I I oijud ne«j I njunL u v u L c x c a v a t i u n

by M r . P o r t e r .

To

the

contrary, on more than one occasion Mr. Dorius verbally affirmed
that he understood that the $3/135 offset was in compromise of
West American's claim to an offset for the alleged negligent
excavation.

In view of the fact that there could hardly be a

dispute about West American's right to a credit for amounts paid
directly to Pioneer Trucking (which amounts exceeded $7,600)/ it
is patently unreasonable for Mr. Porter to believe that the
$3,135 setoff was a credit for a much larger amount paid by West
American directly to Pioneer Trucking.
5
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16. I submit that Mr. Porter has either (a) had second
thoughts about agreeing to a set off, or (b) decided to take
advantage of the leverage he possesses as holder of a mechanic's
lien in terms of West American's ability to sell condominiums at
the construction site without obtaining a release of the lien/ in
order to extract still further sums from West American.
17. As of this date (this affidavit is being prepared on
January 17, 1994) the two checks tendered by West American to Mr.
Dorius in settlement of this action (totalling $15,807.42) have
not been cu!:ui:ned.
Dated this

If ;" day of January, 1994.

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Defendants
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Steven H. Lybbert,
whose identity is known to me, this j %

day of January, 1994.

r~~—
i H M i
»\^3^

u. L r40017*"'*"! i
':'^^\^'l

Notary Public residing
Lake Jounty, Utah

LrtTSalt
^
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AT1TJRN1SY AT LAW
Suite 3 0 2 Felt Building
Ml South Main Street
Suit l^ike City, Utuli 84111
Telephone: (801) 3G3-G890
\iliiiliicd also in Culifomiu

Telecopier. ( 8 0 1 ) 1163-8512

August 31/ 1993

Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City, UT B4302
Re:

Cary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp., et al»

Dear Dale:
This is to confirm the settlement offer I made on behalf of
the defendants in the above-entitled action, and to memorialize
the continuing extension of time to respond to the complaint as
per our telephone conversation this morning.
West American Finance Company is willing to pay $3,135 less
than the full amount of Mr. Porter's billings in full settlement
of his action. I assume that means that West American would pay
$22,405 less any amount it paid directly to Pioneer Trucking for
amounts billed by Mr. Porter.
The offer is extremely reasonable in view of the fact that
if this matter is litigated West American will assert a right to
a set off for approximately $11,500 for the cost of extra shoring
and extra engineering caused by what West American perceives as
your clients crew's negligent over-excavation at the job site.
You were kind enough to confirm that I have a continuing
open extension of time to answer the complaint on behalf of both
defendants, West American and Olympus Bank, at least until your
client responds to the settlement offer. If we cannot settle the
case promptly, I will file an answer for the defendants within
five days of your request that I do so.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Very truly yours,

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:36A
cc: Steve Harmsen
Blake

T.

lleiner
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Dale M. Dorius
ATTORNEY AT LAW

BRANCH

OFFICE

P.O Box 7 2 0
4 7 M A I N STREET

GUNNISON. UTAH 8 4 0 3 4
I80U 5 2 8 7 2 9 0

M A I N OFFICE

P O Box 8 9 5

AOMITTIO:
UTAH STATC BAM I198S)
CALIFORNIA STATC 8AM 119681
COLOAAOO STATC BAH 119881

29 SOUTH M A I N STREET

BRIGHAM CITY. UTAH 8 4 3 0 2
18011 7 2 3 5 2 1 9

August 31, 1993

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney at Law
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance
Corporation, et al.

Dear Mr. Lybbert:
Per your offer of settlement
submit the following.

my

client has authorized me to

My client would be willing to accept $25,600.00 minus offset of
$3,135.00 on condition your client pay him interest at the legal
rate of interest of ten percent (10%) from the date of filing the
Notice of Lien October 30, 1992 and $1,500.00 towards his
attorney fees.
This counteroffer will be open for a period of ten (10) days and
if not accepted will thereafter be withdrawn. Please advise.
Very: f^ruly yours,

ylik

D a l e M. D o r i u s
A t t o r n e y a t Law
DMD:jp

CCC39

jL^jiyaWtl

iVl L A W

Suite 3 0 2 Felt Building
341 Soudi Main Street
S a l t Lake City, U t a h 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 0 8 9 0
Telecopier: ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 8 5 1 2

AdmiUcd ulbo la California

October 19, 1993

Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City,
UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp., et al>

Dear Dale:
Enclosed please find my client's check for $15#591.42 in
full settlement of the above-referenced action.
Also enclosed is a sheet entitled Gary Porter Settlement
specifiying how the amount of the check was calculated and copies
of the two checks showing payment of amounts by West American
directly to Pioneer Sand & Gravel which were included on Mr.
Porter•s invoices.
Also enclosed is a Notice of Dismissal. Assuming you and
Mr. Porter find the numbers to be in order, once the check clears
please sign the Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I
can file it with the court.
Finally/ please find a Release of Lien which I would like
Mr. Porter to sign. Once he has signed the Release of Lien#
please return it to me so that I can file it with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's office.
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or
concerns.
Very truly yours#

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:43A
Enclosures
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen
Blake T. lleiner
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STEVEN II. LYBBERT
AITORNEYATLAW
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801 )3(>3-08<)0
Admitted ulso in CulUonilu

Telecopier: (HOI) 303-8512

October 28/ 1993

VIA FAX
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City/ UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al.

Dear Dale:
Enclosed please find a copy of the front and back of West
American's check number 001018 payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel.
It appears to me that the check was deposited in Pioneer Sand &
Gravel's account at Draper Bank & Trust on December 3/ 1992.
Also enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter to you.
The column of numbers on the far right are mine. After
recalculating interest, it appears that West American may still
owe $637.20. Mr. Harmsen is out of town. I will need to check
with him to determine why he did not add in the amount of
"invoice #8", why he listed "invoice #3" at $2/093.75 rather than
at $2/633.75, and why he listed "invoice #5" at $6/107.50 rather
than at $6/157.50. If the discrepancies were clerical mistakes/
I will urge him to cut another check for $637.20 so that we can
finally resolve this matter.
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or
concerns.
Very truly yours,

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:43B
Enclosures
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen
Blake T. Heiner
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STEVEN II. LYBBERT
ATTORNEY AT I AW
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 303-0890
Telecopier: (801) 363-8512

/Ydmitted also in Cullforniu

November 5/ 1993

VIA FAX
Dale M. Dorius/ Esq.
P.O. Box 895
Brigham City/ UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al»

Dear Dale:
Enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter and my
October 28 letter to you. I have now had an opportunity to
discuss the discrepancies in invoice numbers 3/ 5 and 8 with
Steve Harmsen.
Mr. Harmsen listed invoice #3 at $2/093.75 rather than at
$2/633.75 because the next to last line of invoice #2 (the one
dated "Tues 9-15" contains a $540 charge to pioneer truck for 12
loads at $540.00. The first line of invoice #3 (the one dated
9-16-92) is the same charge. In other words/ invoice numbers 2
and 3 contain a $540.00 double billing.
Mr. Harmsen listed "invoice #5" at $6/107.50 rather than at
$6/157.50 because the fourth item on that invoice (the one dated
9-9-92) is for 11^ hours at $100 per hour/ but the "balance"
column states $1,200.00. It should only be $1/150.00.
By my calculations. West American Finance owes another
$216.00 ($200 principal and $16 interest) in order to finally
settle this matter. Please consult with Mr. Porter. If that is
acceptable/ please contact me and T will promptly forward a check
in that amount. Don't hesitate to call me if you have any
questions or concerns.
Very truly yours/

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:43C
Enclosures
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen
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i\i 1UKNUY AT LAW
Suite 302 Felt Building
Ml South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 841.11

Admitted also in California

Telecopier: (801) 363-8512

November 12/ 1993

Dal£ M. Dorius/ Esq.
P.O* Box 895
Bri^ham City, UT 84302
Re:

Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al.

Dear Dale:
Enclosed please find my client'3 check for $216.00 which/
when added to the $15/591.42 previou3ly tendered/ is full settlement of the above-referenced action.
On October 19, 1993 I sent you an original Notice of
Ois^vasal ^s\d a><\ ocigiueA R^\<^s^ ot Uiecw Pl^aaeL aiqa the
Notice of Dismissal and return it to nie so that I can file it
with the court. Please obtain Mr. porter's signature on the
Release of Lien, then return it to me so that I can record it
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office.
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or
concerns.
Very truly yours/

Steven H. Lybbert
SL:cd:43D
Enclosure
cci Stephen M. Harmsen
Blake T. Heiner

BRANCH OFFICE

LJciic M. uonus
ATTORNEY AT LAW

P O Box 7 2 6
47

MAIN

STftCCT

GUNNISON UTAH 8 4 6 3 4
I80U 5 2 8 7 2 9 6

M A I N OFFICE

P O Box 8 9 5

AOMITTCO
UTAH STATE BAA (19051
CALIFORNIA STATE BAN 11968)
COLORADO STATC BAR 1I96B)

29 SOUTH M A I N STREET

BRIGHAM CITY. UTAH 8 4 3 0 2
(8011 7 2 3 5219

December 8, 1993

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney at Law
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Porter & Son's Construction vs, West American Finance
Corporation, et al.

Dear Mr. Lybbert:
My client indicates he understood the agreement to be that he
would give credit for the $3,100.00 that had been paid to
Pioneer.
My client indicates he did not understand he would be
reducing his sum approximately $3,100.00 from the principal owed
plus the payment made to Pioneer.
My client at this point is not agreeable to the settlement. He
indicates he will only accept the full amount of principal plus
interest at 8% from date of lien; or in the alternative, you may
reduce the principal sum and interest of $3,100.00 if you will
pay his attorney fees in the sum of $2,593.60.
If this counteroffer
within 10 days.

is

not accepted, please file your answer

Vex^y truly yours,

Dale M. DorKis
Attorney at L^w
DMD:]p
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In the Third District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah

GARY A. PORTER, DBA PORTER &
SONS CONSTRUCTION,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 930902266 CV

WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORP,

Hon. Timothy R. Hanson
Clerk: Evelyn Thompson
Date: June 22, 1994
ATP: Brian W. Steffensen
ATD: Steven H. Lybbert
Before the Court, is plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Court's granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and defendant's objection thereto. The matter
has properly been submitted under rule 4-501, cja.
The Court has reviewed the documents submitted by counsel, and otherwise being
fully advised, denies the motion. Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order based on the
Court's ruling.

cc: Brian W. Steffensen
Steven Lybbert
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
Attorney for Defendants
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South M a m Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0890
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH
GARY A. PORTER dba PORTER &
SON'S CONSTRUCTION/
Plaintiff,

)
)
]

vs.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL)

]

WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORPORATION/ a Utah corporation/ and
OLYMPUS BANK,

I

Case No. 930902266 CV

)

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

On May 9, 1994 the court entered its Order Granting Motion
for Summary Judgment/ granting the motion for summary judgment
filed by defendants.

The motion was made on the ground that an

accord and satisfaction had been reached between the parties and/
among other things, directed defendants to resubmit to plaintiff
$15,807.42 previously tendered to plaintiff in satisfaction of
the accord.
On April 12, 1994 defendants did submit a check to
plaintiff's attorney for $15,807.42 and thereby complied with the
terms of the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment.
On this date the court entered its Order denying plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration of the order Granting Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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Based thereon, and good cause appearing/
IT IS ORDERED/ ADJUDGED AND DECREED

mary judgment be

and hereby is granted in favor of defend

against

plaintiff and this action is dismissed.
Dated this

/% day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on June 24/ 1994 a
true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
mailed/ by first class mail/ postage prepaid/ and addressed to:
Brian W. Steffensen/ Esq.
Huntsman Building/ Suite 200
3760 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City/ UT 84106
1

2

H
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on February /~7 / 1995
two copies of the foregoing Appellees' Brief were mailed* by
first class mail/ postage prepaid/ to:
Brian W. Steffensen/ Esq.
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, P.C.
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Appellees

